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The Lawyer and His Neighbors
By

HARLAN

F.

STONE'

In 1710 Cotton Mather, the famous New England divine, in what
was probably the first address to American lawyers, thus exhorted our
profession:
"There has been an old Complaint, That a Good Lawyer seldom is
a Good Neighbor. You know how to Confute it, Gentlemen, by
making your Skill in the Law, a Blessing to your Neighborhood.
You may, Gentlemen, if you please, be a vast Accession to the Felicity
of your Countreys. * * * Perhaps you may discover things yet
wanting in the Law: Mischiefs in the Execution and Application of
the Laws, which ought to be better provided against; Mischiefs
annoying of Mankind, against which no Laws are yet provided. The
Reformation of the Law, and more Law for the Reformation of the
World is what is mightily called for."
These sentiments might well be taken as a guide by which the
lawyer should regu ate his life, but it is probable that Cotton Mather,
ingivingutteranceto them was expressing a pious hope rather than a
confident prediction, for the evidence is abundant that the legal
profession was held in light esteem in the New World until about the
middle of the eighteenth century. It was not then deemed needful
that judges should be lawyers and, as is pointed out by Charles
Warren in his history of the American Bar, the lawyer was everywhere
distrusted. In many colonies those acting as attorneys were forbidden to receive any fee. In others paid attorneys were not allowed
to appear in court and in all they were subjected to restrictions indicating a want of confidence in their character and integrity. It is
doubtful whether at the time when Cottdn Mather wrote, any of the
New England states had accepted the common law of England as a
rule of decision in the Colonial Courts, and the other colonies, with the
exception of Maryland and Virginia, had only accepted it in part.
Indeed, in the mother country, although the lawyer held a distinguished position at the bar there had long been a significant undercurrent of dissatisfaction with law and its administration which found
expression in the publication of books andpamphlets, such as "Speech
againstthe judgesfor theirignorance" 1641, "TheMirror of Justices,"
written long before but first printed in 1645, "The Downfall of the
'An address before the Cornell University College of Law, May 16, 1919, on
the Frank Irvine Foundation established by the Conkling (Cornell) Chapter of
Phi Delta Phi.
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Unjust Lawyers," "Doomsday Drawing Near, with Thunder and
Lightening for Lawyers," 1645, "A Rod for lawyers who are hereby
declared robbers and deceivers of the nation," 1659, and many
others of a similar character which might be named. It is interesting
and instructive to inquire the reasons for the low estate of the lawyer
in this period of our history for I think they have their lesson in our
own day and throw light on our own problems.
The Anglo-Saxon race, both in the old and in the new world, was
then entering a new period of development which made it inevitable that the common law should either crumble into fragments
or take on a new flexibility and adaptability in order to conform to the
changing conditions of social and national life. Feudal England was
experiencing the beginning of its transformation into commercial and
colonial England. The narrowness and pedantry of the feudal law
of Coke was only beginning to feel the effect of the decisions of Lord
Holt and it was yet to experience the benefits of the judgments of
Lord Mansfield which gave to our law renewed capacity for orderly
expansion and development. Moreover, the recollection was fresh
in the minds of men of the servile if not corrupt judges and law officers
of the crown of the period of the Stuarts, the last of their kind in
English history to stain the annals of the profession. It was not
strange, therefore, that the colonies in the New World had an inherited
distrust of judges and lawyers.
But there were special reasons for this attitude to be found in the
local conditions and the peculiar situation of the legal profession in
America. There was in the entire New World no developed science
of law and there were few materials available out of which to organize
one. The total number of published law books to be found in the
colonies probably did not exceed a dozen, there were no reports of the
colonial court proceedings, and the total number of English reports in
the colonies were about 3o. There were no law schools, and few if
any lawyers of character and distinction to act as preceptors of the
younger men of the profession. Small wonder then that the lawyers
of the time were of the pettifogging, court-hanger-on type which then,
as now, reflected only discredit on the profession.
It is interesting to contrast this picture of our profession during the
first hundred years of our Colonial history with Edmund Burke's
reference to it some sixty years later in his celebrated Oration for
Conciliation with the Colonies. I have often quoted the passage, for
it states so admirably most of the qualities which have given to our
profession its distinction and which have made it such a potent instrumentality in critical times in its history for the preservation of liberty
and the perpetuation of right. He referred to the spirit and activity
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of the lawyer class in the American colonies as one of the capital causes
of the spirit of liberty in the new world. "In no country perhaps in
the world," he said, "is the law so generally studied" and in proof of
this statement he referred to the great number of lawyers who were
members of the Continental Congress to the fact that law books were
being printed in the colonies for their own use and that as many copies
of Blackstone's Commentaries had been sold in America as in En gland.
He expressed the opinion that it was the wide-spread study of and
interest in lawwhichmade the Colonists so" acute, inquisitive, prompt
in attack, ready in defense, full of resources," which led them to
"augurmisgovernment at a distance andsnuff the approach of tyranny
in every tainted breeze."
Burke's portrayal of the position and influence of the legal profession in Revolutionary America was not overdrawn. The history of
the Revolgtion and of the formative period of the union of states is a
record of leadership and of the influence of the bar which has never
be.en surpassed at any time or in any country. Suchnamesas James
Otis, John Adams, Josiah Quincy, Robert Payne of Massachusetts,
Peyton Randolph, Patrick Henry, Edmund Pendleton of Virginia,
Charles Carroll and Samuel Chase of Maryland, and Alexander
Hamilton and James Kent of New York recall vividly to mind not
only the remarkable development of the English comMon law in
America during the latter part of the x8th century but the ascendency
of the legal profession in legislation and in the political and social life
of the growing nation. Lawyers were the most influential members
of the Colonial legislature, and the Continental Congress. Of the 55
signers of the Declaration of Independence more than one-half were
lawyers. They not only kindled the flame of the Revolution but they
translated the Revolution into institutions under the forms of law
with a passionate devotion to liberty and a skill and statesmanlike
grasp which has excited the wonder and admiration of the historian.
They profoundly influenced the formul'ation of the Constitution and
the great legislative acts organizing the administrative and judicial
arms of the government were the creations of lawyers. The Constitution itself was vitalized and made an effective instrument of government by Chief Justice Marshall aided by an able bar.
How shall we account for these striking changes in the authority
and influence of our profession in a period comparatively so brief?
From a vocation generally held in contempt and almost outlawed,
how was it that in less than fifty years it attained a position of
influence as deserved as it was assured? If we study the history of
the times we shall be forced to conclude that this rise to eminence was
coincident with and I believe very largely in consequence of the
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development of law as a science in the Colonies and of the application
to it of improved educational methods. Burke was*ightly impressed
with the avidity with which law books were studied in the colonies.
In the latter part of the i8th century the importation of law books
from England greatly increased and although judgedbymodern standards the list of importations was a meagre one, the standard law books
of the period, such as Coke on Littleton, Comyn's Digest, Hale's and
Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, Lily's Entries, and Blackstone's Commentaries were eagerly sought and widely read. Of greater importance was the growing practice for young men seeking the bar to give
themselves all the advantages of the best available education.
n contrast to our own day, a liberal college education was generally
regarded as a necessary prerequisite to law study. The lawyers at the
Massachusetts bar between 1788 and 1837 were nearly all college
graduates, for the most part from Harvard but with representation of
Dartmouth, Brown, and Williams. In i805, 77 of the 1o5 members
of the New Hampshire bar were college graduates, and in Maine,
Connecticut, New Jersey and South Carolina a large portion of the
bar, and in New York a somewhat smaller proportion were either
educated for the bar in England or were graduates of American colleges, notably Yale, Princeton, Kings (afterward Columbia) College,
the University of Pennsylvania, and William and Mary College in
Virginia. With all our increased educational facilities, what was then
the rule has now become almost the exception in many of our states
and in New York until recently less than 40 per cent. of the candidates for admission to the bar were college graduates.
A most stimulating influence in setting high standards of education
and attainment for the bar in the new world was the considerable
number of young lawyers who received their training in the Inns of
Court. Notwithstanding the burden of expense and the difficulties
of travel, many young men who afterward became the best known
lawyers of the colonies journeyed to London to receive there the benefits of lawstudyand association in theInns of Court. Here inassociation with young lawyers many of whom became famous at the English
bartheyreceivedtheirlegal training profoundlyinfluencedby the traditions of the English bar and by the notions of individual right and
liberty which then characterized legal thought and which has become
our greatest heritage from the English common law. From 176o to
the close of the Revolution i 5 Americans were admitted to the Inns
of Court: from South Carolina 47, from Virginia 21, from Maryland
16, from Pennsylvania, ii from New York 5 and from each of the
other colonies one or two.
The influences which gave the English bar an exclusive and aristo-
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cratic character operated even more strongly in the new world.
Here the absence of an aristocracy founded on hereditary privilege,
and the absence of great wealth gained from the rapid development of
commerce and industry during the later phase of our history gave to
our bar an unquestioned social and political leadership to which perhaps it could not under other conditions have attained. These
influences made the bar the most English of our institutions and during the early part of the i 9 th century it had a more highly developed
class consciousness than probably at any other time in its history.
In a number of states the distinction between barristers and attorneys
was maintained for a time after the Revolution, notably in Massachusetts, New York and New Jersey. Numerous associations of the
bar, variously known as moots, sodalities or local bar associations
sought to exercise the functions of the Inns of Court in promoting the
social and professional unity of the bar and in exercising control over
the admission to practice. The system of appointment of judicial
officers still obtained. The judges were generally selected from the
leaders of the bar and the bar exercised a very considerable influence in
their selection. Conditions which tended to give to the bar a solidarity and a sense of corporate responsibility which has never quite
been equalled in any later period.
Since about the year 1832 the history of the American bar to my
mind falls naturally into two distinct phases or periods: the first of
these ended shortly after the Civil War and the second is, I believe,
now drawing to a close. During the early part of the i 9 th century
the bar came nearer to constituting an exclusive privileged class in the
new republic than any other group in the community.
It is perhaps not unnatural that with the reaction against English
institutions following the Revolution and the spread of Jeffersonian
democracy there should have been a revulsion of feeling, especially in
the newer communities of the west, against what many chose to regard
as the aristocratic pretensions of the bar and its tendency to arrogate
to itself special rights and privileges. In two ways this popular distrust of lawyers and their ways produced changes in our institutions
which have profoundly influenced the bar and their relation to the
people. The first of these was a gradual abandonment of the system
of appointment to judicial office. In 1832 the State of Mississippi
adopted a Constitution providing for the popular election of judicial
officers for short terms of office. This change of policy was soon
followed by a majority of the states, so that the system of appointment in its original form has been retained in only four states. Unfortunately, there is no record of the debates in the constitutional convention which adopted the Mississippi Constitution in 1832. If, how-
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ever, the records of other constitutional conventions may be taken as
indicating the reasons for the change it was due not to any necessity
of remedying abuses but to the spread of the extreme democratic
movement which accepted as a part of its fundamental philosophy
the principle that the power of selection of all governmental officers
should be exercised by the people through the ballot, a doctrine
which ultimately led to the selection of practically all state and
municipal officers by popular election.
This change in the method of selecting judges had important consequences on the character and general qualifications of the judges
selected. A no less competent and disinterested observer than James
Bryce attributes the general inferiority of the judges in a number of
states to those of the federal bench and the English bench, to the limited
terms of office and to the method of their selection. But what is more
to the point in our present inquiry, it tended to break down the
solidarity of the bar since judicial honors ceased to be the customary
reward for leadership at the bar. It widened the gap between the
bench and the profession at large and deprived the bar of the authoritative leadership exercised in the earlier days by judges who were
elevated to the bench as recognition of their leadership at the bar
rather than as a reward for political service as has proved too often to
be the case under the elective system.
The other change brought about during this second period and due
to similar causes was a gradual lowering of the educational and professional standards which had prevailed for the bar in the earlier history 'of the county. In Massachusetts and in New York and in most
of the other states the educational requirements for admission to the
bar at the close of the i8th century, judged in comparison with general
educational standards and facilities were far more exacting than they
were at a period within our own recollection. For example, the
Suffolk County, Mass., bar in 1768 required the candidate to obtain
the consent of the bar before beginning his law study. He was
required to study law three years before admission to'practice before
the inferior courts, two additional years before admission to practice
before the Supreme Court, and two years more before he could assume
the office of barrister. As early as 1771 the Suffolk County bar
made a college education a prerequisite to law study. In New York
in 1797, a period of seven years law study was required of all candidates for admission to the bar.
The transition from such requirements to the provision of the
Indiana constitution that any citizen should have an unqualified right
to admission to the bar marks the triumph of pure democracy over
any pretensions that the bar should be either exclusive or learned.
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In other states some formal requirements for admission to the bar
were retained but they were far less exacting than those to which I
have referred and their administration was in most cases perfunctory.
The underlying cause of this transition was as I have said the trend
toward extreme democracy and the popular reaction against the creation by government of a privileged class from which any freeborn
American could be excluded. But there were other contributory
causes to be found in the special situation of a new country remote
from contact with older civilization. Especially important was the
severance from the mother country which cut off our lawyers from
close relationship with the English bar and thus limited the force of
its traditions and influence. The rapid expansion of the country
into thenewcommunities of the south and west inevitably developed
a social life free from convention and impatient of formal restrictions on freedom of action.
But whatever the causes one cabnot doubt that the effect on the
American bar was a distinct loss in the average quality of its membership and a consequent loss of its prestige and authority in the life of
the nation. If one compares the annals of the bar during theperiod
183o to i86o with the years immediately following the Revolution he
is impressed with the decline of the corporate spirit of the bar and of
that feeling of corporate responsibility for law administration which
guarded jealously the avenues of approach to the law and exacted
high professional standards of all those who succeeded in passing its
barriers. Great leaders, there still were-Webster, Choate, Chase,
Binney, Shaw, aregreat names in the annals of American jurisprudence
and the law itself made more rapid progress in its development than
in any previous period. But the bar as a whole occupied a less commanding position and wielded a declining influence on political life
and public opinion.
The close of the Civil War marked the beginning of economic and
industrial changes which profoundly affected our entire national life
and these changes have had an especially direct and immediate
influence on the practice of law. The penetration of the railroads into
the new west, the opening up of public lands to settlers, the rapid growth
of manufacturing and commerce, with the consequent increase of population in the industrial centers, the development of the great industrial
corporations, have not only expandea greatly our statute and common
law but have given us a new type of lawyer and a new leadership of
the bar. The real growth of the law of corporations, railroads and
public service companies, and insurance have taken place within a
brief period of about 50 years, a growth so rapid and the problems of
administration have been so involved with the problems of business
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organization that we have been compelled to resort in these fields to
law administration through administrative boards and commissions.
As was perhaps inevitable the march of economic events has substituted for the leadership of the advocate and the legal scholar the
leadership of the business lawyer and specialist. At his best he is the
skillful, resourceful solicitor, and at his worst a mere hired man of
corporations. Such leadership undoubtedly requires a training and
intellectual power of the first order and at its best it is no less honorable than that of the great jurist or the barrister, but it has tended to
give to the practice of law more and more the characteristics of business rather than of a learned profession and has contributed not a
little to the decline of professional standards and the corporate spirit
and activity of the bar which began some two generations ago.
For a considerable period the bar associations were less active and
their membership as compared with the numbers of the profession too
small to exercise effective influence over the profession at large. The
story of the early bar associations in New England which embraced
practically the entire membership of the bar and exercised a control
over all its activities, presents an attractive picture when compared
with the waning influence of bar associations in later times. We can
now discern a much to be desired increase in activities and influence of
the various state and local bar associations but it is not so many years
ago when less than 25 per cent. of the lawyers in New York City were
members of any bar association. In short, I believe it would not be
difficult to select a date late in the century just past when it might
fairly be said that the American bar in point of requirements for
admission, professional standards, corporate spirit, and professional
self consciousness had reached the low water mark in its history.
Lest I be charged with drawing too gloomy a picture I hasten to
explain that in making this statement I refer to the bar as a whole
and I exclude from the indictment that part of it made up of men of
education, drawn very largely from the leading law schools of the
country, who have preserved the best traditions of the profession.
Under any system of regulation and control of the bar, however lax,
we should have and let us hope always will have such a group, a bar
within the bar, setting its own standards of professional attainment and
right conduct, believing and acting on the belief that law is a profession worthy of the most rigorous and exacting training and that it
demands the loyal adherence to those intellectual and ethical standards which are essential to the well being and effective influence of
any profession.
It is the inspiration of this group which I believe attracts annually
in increasing numbers so many of the graduates of our colleges and
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universities to the leading law schools of the country for their preparation for the bar. Such a group suffers inevitably in public reputation
and influence from the association with great numbers who, because
of low standards of admission and professional fitness are in no proper
sense worthy of membership in a learned profession. In consequence
the bar has carried an almost insupportable burden of a large membership unfitted for its responsibilities by education and training and
without any natural inclination to maintain its traditions.
The last thirty years has witnessed the growth of agencies which are
making some progress toward improvement of these conditions. The
most note-worthy of these is the better class of law schools. As a
class they have labored unremittingly for the improvement of legal
education and they have steadily raised the preliminary educational
requirement for admission to law schools. The influence of their
example has been diluted by the growth of great numbers of schools
without recognizable professional or educational ideals. Their aim
has been to make admission to the bar so easy and expeditious as to
attract to them great numbers of students who have neither the
patience nor the capacity nor the educational background to meet the
exacting requirements of thorough-going professional study. The
result has been the diversion of large numbers of young men from useful careers in trade or business to the legal profession for which they
have neither natural aptitude nor adequate preparation. To have
deprived the community of a competent plumber or a capable insurance agent in order to give to it an inferior lawyer is not only economically wasteful but it is positively injurious to the individual and to the
public at large which has a direct and vital interest in the capacity and
probity of the bar. An indispensable adjunct and unfailingprop tb the
low-grade law school is the lax bar examination. In fact, the rapi
growth of this type of lawschool in the last twenty years is accounted
for mainly by the development of the kind of bar examinations which
can be passed by the aid of the "cramming" law school but which are
not sufficiently searching and discriminating to be real tests of the
adequacy and effectiveness of the lawyer's training.
Recent years have witnessed a revival in interest in professional
ethics, a greater activity of the bar associations-state, national and
local-and a greater interest and activity in some localities at least in
purging the bar of its unworthy members. These are helpful signs
which give promise of a reviving professional, corporate spirit and that
the bar will develop in increasing measure a wholesome self respect.
But with respect to the two steps which are most essential to strengthening the position and influence of the bar, namely, the raising of the
standards of legal education and improving the bar examinations-
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the bar as a whole is still apathetic. The impetus to reform and
improvement has come almost wholly from the law schools with
little aid from the profession at large or from the various bar associations of the country. In this respect the bar has lagged behind the
medical profession which has set us a commendable example in taking steps through the American Medical Association to adopt high
standards of professional training and to grade the medical schools
of the country according as they measure up to those standards or
fall below them. In all but one state attendance at and graduation
from an approved medical school is required before admission to practice medicine. But no state requires the study of law atalaw school
as a prerequisite to practice law and no state requires a preliminary
education beyond that of a high school to prospective members of
the bar.
It is a false notion of democracy that would deny to the state the
right to exact adequate training and skill from its public servants or
that would assume that equality of political rights should entitle
the citizen to any right to enter a learned profession without adequate
qualifications for the performance of its duties.
The argument is often advanced that a standard sufficiently high
to improve the bar generally would have kept Abraham Lincoln from
becoming a lawyer. This argument is without merit, principally
because it is based on a false assumption. Abraham Lincoln as a
young man had an education superior to the standards of education
which prevailed in his own community. Had he lived in this day and.
generation who is there who knows of his life and character who could
doubt that he would have availed himself to the utmost of the educational advantages which are open to every man of ability and character regardless of his station in life. With our present educational
facilities no standard of admission to the bar which has ever been proposed would have kept any man fitted by character and ability for
membership in the bar from entering it. The danger until recent
years has been not that we would keep our Abraham Lincolns from
the bar but that by our indifference to the problem we should permit
the bar to be discredited and its influence destroyed by an inundation
of the unfit. The notion that the bar in this country could ever have
become an undemocratic institution through increased educatioal
standards is an utterly mistaken one. There is no force in American
life more potent for democracy and the preservation of our free institutions than the education of our colleges and universities. No
section of our country asks for less democracy but all should ask that
the agencies of democracy should be more intelligent, better trained
and better fitted to bear their responsibilities.
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In the years since I came to the bar much progress has been made
toward securing a wider and better understanding of this problem.
Nearly all states now have uniform examinations; in many the examinations are more exacting, but in most they leave much to be desired.
In all states preliminary educational requirements are too low. The
better class of law schools have raised their own standards and they
are preaching unceasingly the gospel of a better bar through better
education and higher standards. What is now needed is closer
co6peration between all agencies for improvement of the bar,-the
law schools, the bar, the courts, and the bar associations. The
American bar, like the American Medical Association, ought to be
neither afraid nor ashamed to say what it considers adequate training
for the bar,-what schools provide it, and what boards of bar examiners exact it.
I have said that I regard the third phase of the history of the American bar as now drawing to a close. Just as the phase of our economic
expansion must now give place to a period of more intensive development of all our natural and acquired resources, so the field of law will
now have to be more intensively cultivated. Instead of the rapid
expansion of corporate organization requiring expert service of the
best lawyers we shall see corporations more and more transacting their
routine legal work in their own legal. departments and we may hope to
see a greater number of lawyers turn to advocacy and the study of
purely legal problems. Through the study of comparative law,
through a better understanding of legal doctrine, and through more
scientific legislation we may make progress towards the simplification
of law and prepare to approach the great problem which the multiplication of precedents embodied in our judicial decisions is pressing
upon us. 'Whether it will be solved by codification or a restatement
of the law or by lessening the emphasis placed on precedent, or by
some device by which the number of precedents will be diminished,
no man can now say. But we may be certain that it will not be adequately solved unless the legal profession brings to bear on it the
resources which come from thorough training and an enlightened and
intelligent grasp of the nature and functions of law in social organization.
DeToqueville regarded the bar as the most conservative force in
our American life, a conclusion which he reached as a result of his own
observation. But he might well have reached the conclusion on
a priorigrounds. The lawyer class more than any other preserves
unbroken the continuity of the past with the present. He formulates
his rules of conduct on the basis of what has been done in the past.
His habit of studying and following precedent inclines his mind to
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reverence what is established and to look with distrust on what is
novel and untried. The lawyer's habit of caution which so often
protects his client from the consequences of rash action is a real conservative force in the community which should not be lightly valued.
But the conservative mind is subject to two great dangers,-the danger
of intolerance and the danger of its becoming "closed mind." I would
not beunderstoodasregardingintolerance as exclusively a vice of conservative minds. It is a fault of the radical as well and I find almost
asmuch intolerance amongthosewho pride themselves on their liberal
opinion as among the conservatives who are impatient and distrustful of the innovator. To cite an example from our own profession,
who could be more intolerant than Jeremy Bentham, the great law
reformer who saw in the common law only a "fathomless and boundless chaos made up of fiction, tautology, technicality, and inconsisttency and the administrative part of it a system of exquisitively contrived chicanery which maximizes delay and denial of justice."
The convulsion of war through which the world has just been passing, as was perhaps inevitable, has bred a spirit of intolerance which
has found expression in legislation and in law administration and in
some instances in the lax administration of it. In the period of reconstruction and readjustment, when the new order clashes with the old,
the bar, in legislation, in law administration, should deal with the new
problems with a wise tolerance. We ought not in this generation and
in the troubled times that are before us to forget that the most
precious inheritances which the bar brought from the mother country
were our notions of personal liberty and our belief that the function of
laW is to deal with and regulate conduct and not the freedom of
opinion and speech when it does not incite to unlawful acts. One of
the great tasks of reconstruction is the winning back from the encroachments of government, that individual liberty which for over
300 years has dominated the enlightened thought of the Anglo-Saxon
race. Since the days of Hampden who was trained as a lawyer the
members of the profession who at critical times have stood for liberty
and justice have given to the bar its real character and influence.
They have, to quote the words of Burke, augured "misgoverment at a
distance" and snuffed "the approach of tyranny in every tainted
breeze."
As indicative of the part which the bar should play in what I
have referred to as the reconstruction period, nothing could be more
wholesome than the determination of the American Bar Association to
investigate the system of military justice in the United States.
Without attempting to express any opinion of the wisdom and efficacy
of that system, I believe it is important that as lawyers we should be
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keenly apprehensive of the unjust exercise of arbitrary power in our
governmental system whether civil or military and that we should be
the first in the community to protect the rights of the individual from
the encroachments by the exercise of such power whether it be clothed
in the forms or law or relies upon popular prejudice or indifference to
escape the consequences of its own unlawful acts. For that reason in
my judgment the bar of the country has a special duty and mission at
this time to scrutinize critically and jealously those laws whose enactment in principle was doubtless necessary to the prosecution of a great
war, which encroach upon the field of individual liberty in placing
restrictions upon the free expression of opinion and the free communication of information and the expression of ideas. At this time when
the world has just been inundated with German falsehood and at a
time when, I believe, we are about to hear the preaching of a great deal
of false social and economic philosophy, we are prone to forget the
teachings of history that in the long run there is greater danger to
human progress in the arbitrary repression of truth than in freedom to
disseminate falsehood. The Inquisition did not destroy heresy; the
truth will thrive without its aid.
Another field for study and investigation by lawyers and our schools
of law which places emphasis on the rights of the individual is the just
and equal application of the laws to the individual. By this I refer
not only to the denial of justice which results from giving rein to the
spirit of lynch law and mob violence which is one of the most serious
problems of law administration in this country, but to the
great problem of making our legal system an effective agency
for administering justice where the interest involved is too small or the
suitor is too humbly situated to command the legal skill requisite
for a just result. Nothing could tend more to cause popular distrust of lawyers and courts and to affect injuriously that which we
reverence most in our legal system than the wide spread belief
in our growing industrial communities that legal justice which should
be free and equally available to all is in practice to be had only in
the large cause or by the well-to-do suitor. Nor is there any
problem more difficult of practical solution. Whether it is to be met
by the extension of the activities of the Legal Aid Society or whether,
as seems more likely, by the reconstruction of our judicial system
and a modification of our procedure in the courts for small causes, the
problem is one for lawyers to study and settle in the public interest
and in the interest and for the credit of their own profession.
It is impossible that we should diligently study the English common
law as it has been moulded and adapted by our Equity system without
profound admiration and respect for it as, on the whole, as sane and
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beneficent a system for the administration of justice as man could
have devised. Moreover, the tendency of the common law when
placed in direct competition with other systems of law to supplant
them gives us faith in its durability and its adaptability to the needs
of the people. This attitude on the part of lawyers has given occasion
forthechargenotalwaysunjustly made that they are overcomplacent
and self-satisfied in contemplating the beauties and excellencies of
our law.
The habit of lawyers of regarding our legal system as a perfected
one and of closing the mind to the possibilities of its improvement is
not without its unfortunate consequences to our profession. That
Blackstone became so lost in admiring contemplation of the law
that he wrote of it as the perfection of human reason must have
had an incalculable effect on the generation of lawyers who have
accepted his Commentaries as their legal gospel. When we are
inclined to think of our law as a finished and perfected system we
ought to remember that when Blackstone wrote, the law denied to
married women most of the substantial rights of property; the
criminal law imposed a catalog of bloody penalties which we would
now regard as abhorrent to any system of justice; it denied to the
accused the benefit of counsel and the right of appeal; one could not
testify as a witness in his own behalf and on the assumption that all
atheists were untruthful, it accepted the testimony of atheists who
were willing to lie and excluded that of those who had the integrity
and moral courage to subject themselves to public contempt by
admitting their atheism. We ought not to forget that within the last
century nearly all the prominent judges of England, learned and able
men that they were, opposed giving to one charged with crime the
benefit of counsel. The entire history of our law has been one of
change and adaptttion to meet new conditions, social and economic,
and to conform to a more enlightened ethical perception. In the very
nature of things our law cannot become a finished and perfected system until all society itself is both perfect and static.
In the social readjustment which is even now going on as a consequence of the great war the philosophy of law as it finds expression in
the theories of contracts, property, and established rights will be subjected to new tests. I would not have lawyers any less conservative
in their judgments; I would not have them hold any less reverence
for the past or any less confidence in the capacity of the common law to
adjust itself to new conditions. But I would have them approach
these new problems with open and inquiring minds.
Take for example, the problem of the status in our law of bankers'
letters of credit, which will soon be pressing for solution in our courts.
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In most states the question is novel because before the war most
bankers' credits were issued in the great financial centers of Europe.
Will their validity depend on the ancient doctrine of consideration, on
the law of trusts, or will it rest on the basis of estoppel or will they
be given currency by an extension of the law merchant as instruments
executed in the course of business with the intention and purpose that
they should be relied upon? Has the vast expansion of the powers of
government in the exercise of its war powers changed our established
notion of the relations of government to the individual? Will the
police power be expanded in the general social interests or will there be
a reaction in favor of the rights of the individual? Has our experience
of government control of public carriers changed our views of the
principles of regulation and control of public service corporations?
And so one might go on almost indefinitely suggesting new questions
in every field of human endeavor which will in the future require
re-examination by lawyers.
As law students, as law teachers, as practicing lawyers, as judges,
we should be constantly questioners of the validity and sufficiency of
legal doctrine. For the questioner, as John Stuart Mill said, "need
not be an enemy;" indeed, he who questions in the light of experience,
intelligently and with an open mind, is the true friend of human
progress and best makes his contribution to human well-being.
As I see our profession today it is better prepared than at any time
for at least sixty years to meet and solve the problems of the adaptation of law to changing conditions The established practice of the
better law schools of searching for the underlying reason for legal
rules; the constant habit of examining legal doctrine in the light of
what Burke held to be the "two and only two fundamentals of the law
-equity and utility" has given to the bar an increasing number of
lawyers whose respect for the law is not any the less because it is
intelligent and discriminating. Their influence is undoubtedly
increasing in the profession. The bar as a whole in its association,
in its participation, in the efforts for better legislative methods, in its
effort to discipline its unworthy members, is displaying greater activity
and a high sense of corporate responsibility.
For all this the profession is to be congratulated; not for what has
been accomplished but for what has been promised.
The lawyer's problem still is, as in Cotton Mather's day, how to
become a better neighbor. He will solve it by making his skill a
blessing to his neighborhood. That will be accomplished in increasing measure when lawyers as a class are adequately trained; when
with unfailing devotion to liberty and justice they examine their new
problems in the light of experience with tolerant and inquiring minds.

